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Terrorists and High-Speed Surfers: 
Towards a Sociological Conception of Performative Identity 
Hartmut Rosa 
Abstract 
This essay explores the transformative effects of social evolution from pre- or early to 
late-modern societies on the temporality of the life-course and on the temporal pat-
terns of identity. It takes the temporal fabric of all forms of identity as its starting 
point. The main claim it seeks to establish is that the ‘classical’ form of modern iden-
tity, i.e. the conception of a stable personal identity, is tied up with the generational 
pace of social change. However, due to the effects of social acceleration the rates of 
change and social innovation have crossed the threshold to an intra-generational pace 
of change. Because of the resulting instability in the patterns of association and the 
culturally relevant forms of knowledge and practice, the forms of identity and the 
temporalities of the life-course are forced to adapt. As a consequence, the modern 
conception of personal identities is about to be replaced by new forms of ‘performa-
tive identity’. Four empirically observable types of such an identity are presented and 
discussed in the concluding section of this contribution. 
 
Terroristen und High-Speed Surfer: 
Auf dem Weg zu einer soziologischen Konzeption performativer Identität 
Zusammenfassung 
Dieser Beitrag untersucht die Auswirkungen des gesellschaftlichen Wandels von der 
Früh- über die Hoch- zur Spätmoderne auf die zeitliche Konstitution des Lebenslaufs, 
der Biographie und der personalen Identität. Er rekonstruiert zunächst die inhärent 
zeitliche Verfasstheit jeglicher Identität und versucht dann nachzuweisen, dass die 
‚klassische’ Form stabiler moderner Identität nur vor dem Hintergrund eines generati-
onalen Tempos des sozialen Wandels plausibel und realisierbar ist. Weil jedoch als 
ein Effekt der sozialen Beschleunigung die Veränderungsraten in den Beziehungs-
mustern und Praxisformen inzwischen eine intra-generationale Geschwindigkeit er-
reicht haben, sind die spätmodernen Biographie- und Identitätsmuster zu einer Anpas-
sung gezwungen. Diese Anpassung erfolgt in Form eines Übergangs von stabilen 
personalen zu neuartigen situativen oder ‚performativen’ Identitäten. Im letzten Teil 
des Beitrags werden deshalb vier empirisch beobachtbare Typen solcher performati-
ver Identität vorgestellt und diskutiert. 
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1. Introduction 
The temporal patterns of our individual life – its rhythms and speeds, horizons and 
durations – are closely interwoven with the temporal patterns, rhythms and speeds of 
society. Time is intrinsically social – whether it is the time of our lives or the time of 
the social fabric. Therefore, changes in the temporal patterns of society are inevitably 
mirrored in the temporality of the life-course and of individual identities. In fact, time 
is one of the key elements in linking social micro- and macro-structures: The media-
tion between actions and structures, between institutional imperatives and individual 
orientations, is regulated by temporal patterns. Thus, time is the bridge between indi-
vidual action and social structure. Since subjects generally perceive time as something 
that is simply and naturally given, they are most of the time unaware of its implicit 
social steering-effects. 
In this essay I aim to explore the transformative effects of social evolution from 
pre- or early modern to late modern societies on the temporality of the life-course and 
on the temporal patterns of identity. The main claim I seek to establish is that the 
‘classical’ form of modern identity, i.e. the conception of a stable personal identity, is 
tied up with a generational pace of social change. However, due to the effects of so-
cial acceleration (Rosa 2005/2012) the rates of change and social innovation have 
crossed the threshold to an intra-generational pace of change. Because of the resulting 
instability in the patterns of association and the culturally relevant forms of 
knowledge and practice, the patterns of identity and the temporalities of the life-
course are forced to adapt. As a consequence, the modern conception of stable per-
sonal identities, based on the idea of a set of individualized parameters of identity 
such as profession, religion, family, political outlook etc., is no longer feasible in the 
21st century – it is about to be replaced by new forms of ‘performative identity’. 
In order to lend some empirical credibility to this claim, I will first sketch out the 
ways in which identities are constituted by time, or by temporal perspectives (2.). In 
the third part, I will proceed to systematically reconstruct the ways in which the tem-
poral patterns of modern society change. My main claim here is that modernity is 
inherently dynamic in that it is driven by an incessant process of social acceleration. 
From the 18th century onward, the three dimensions of technological acceleration, of 
an acceleration of social change and of a speed-up in the pace of life, interlink in a 
way that progressively transforms the temporal patterns of society. In this process, I 
will argue, two critical thresholds are crossed when the pace of change exceeds: first, 
the pace of inter-generational exchange and, second, the pace of generational ex-
change (3.). The biographical effects of these critical crossings will be explored in the 
fourth part (4.) of this paper before I finally sketch out the four types, or patterns, of 
biographical identity which appear to be compatible with late-modern social tempo-
rality (5.). As we shall see, each of these types appears to be deeply problematic, such 
that it is hard to avoid the diagnosis of an impingent temporal crisis in late-modernity. 
 
2. Times of Life: Identity and the Three Dimensions of ‘Our Time’ 
What do we mean when, in reflecting on our life, we refer to ‘our’ time? Which time 
is ‘our’ time? In fact, there are three different dimensions of ‘our time’ which are 
reflected in three different meanings of the term. First, ‘our time’ is the time of our 
everyday-lives: ‘I have fifteen minutes before the shop closes, so don’t waste my 
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time’ or ‘don’t steal my time, I have a long list of things to do today’ are exemplary 
instances of this usage of ‘our time’. It refers to the problem of scheduling, sequenc-
ing and ‘timing’ the activities of our work, or of family-life, or our free-time, on a 
day-to-day basis and solving the problems of synchronization and coordination. ‘My 
time’ thereby is in competition with the time-budgets of other people or organizations.  
Secondly, however, we sometimes step back from our routine- and day-to-day ac-
tivities and reflect upon our lives as a whole. ‘I have seventy or eighty years to realize 
my dreams’ we might say, or: ‘I don’t want to spend my time working in a factory, I 
want to do something else with my life!’ Here ‘our time’ is not everyday-time, but 
life-time, so to speak. In this perspective, we reflect on the temporal ordering of our 
life-course as a whole. The question of what we want to do with our life here becomes 
synonymous to the question of how we want to spend ‘our’ time.  
This latter question, however, we cannot answer in a purely solipsistic manner: 
What we (want to) do with our life-time depends, at least in part, on the contexts and 
possibilities, on the opportunities and limitations of ‘our time’ in the third sense: Eve-
ry individual life has to respond to the requirement of the historical epoch it is situat-
ed in. ‘In our time, you have to be fast and flexible’, we might say for example, or ‘in 
our time, education is a primary good’. Or more specific: ‘in our time, it is not a good 
idea to become a monk, a warrior or a shoemaker’. With this we mean that at other 
historical times values, goods, practices or qualities different from those that are rele-
vant today might have been predominant. The times of our lives thus are always and 
at least threefold in the sense of every-day time, life-time and historical time.  
Now, what I want to claim is that the challenge and problem of identity lies pre-
cisely in the successful integration of these three perspectives in a biographical orien-
tation: What we do in our everyday-life has to be meaningfully connected to what we 
want to be or what we want to do with our life, and both have to be negotiated with 
the needs, requirements and challenges of our ‘historical time’ or epoch (Alheit 1988, 
Rosa 2005, 30-39, 352-390). This integration is achieved predominantly in a narrative 
mode when people tell their life-stories and life-plans. What Heiner Keupp and others 
have aptly called ‘Identitätsarbeit’ (Höfer/Keupp 1997), i.e. the on-going process of 
re-constructing one’s identity, to a large extent has to do with precisely this: With 
balancing the perspectives of what we do with those of who we were and will be, or 
want to be, and with what is required of us or recommended to us. 
Generally, these three dimensions of ‘our time’ only come into the focus of atten-
tion when the integration turns problematic in one way or the other; for example in 
phases of biographical transition, when we need to balance our personal plans against 
the requirements of our age, or when we suddenly realize that there is a grave misfit 
between our conception of our life-time and the way we actually spend our every-day-
life. If it is my vision that I will become a great pianist and a family father, while I 
actually spend my time in solitary confinement in front of a computer all year long at 
the age of forty, I have to rethink both: my life-time and my everyday-time.  
Thus, individual identity is always structured in a temporal way; in a sense, identi-
ty is temporality. If we take it that ‘personal identity’ in its most general sense is the 
answer to the question ‘who are you?’, then we have to realize that this answer al-
ways has to include an (at least implicit) account of who I was, and who I have be-
come, and therefore, in addition: of who I could have been or might have been. Fur-
thermore, there is no coherent account of who I am without an (at least implicit) vi-
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sion of who I will be or might be, and also: of whom I do not want to be (Straub 
1998). In this way, identity necessarily contains a biographical and a historical past 
and future, with the challenge of identity being the permanent re-negotiation and re-
integration of these temporal horizons and perspectives. 
Given this inherently temporal and social nature of identity (Lauer 1981), changes 
in the (temporal) fabric of society almost inevitably effect all three temporal levels of 
identity. Whether or not the challenge of integration is met, therefore, depends to a 
considerable extent on the temporal patterns and horizons of society. In the remainder 
of this paper I want to sketch out the ways in which the acceleration of social change 
places considerable stress on the individual’s capability to reconcile everyday-time-
perspectives with life-perspectives and historical consciousness.  
 
3. Times of Change: Social Acceleration and Cultural Transformation 
In a number of recent publications (Rosa 2003, 2006, Rosa/Scheuerman 2009), I have 
tried to establish the point that modernity is best understood, first, if it is analysed as 
an on-going process of modernization, and second, if this process is interpreted as a 
progressive dynamization of the material, social, and spiritual fabric of society. This 
process I seek to capture with the term of social acceleration. Since social accelera-
tion, which always refers to the relation between two points in time, is defined as a 
quantitative increase per unit of time (e.g: more miles per hour, more produced cars 
per year, more bits processed per second, more job-positions held or life-partners 
chosen in an average life-time, or more things done within a week), it can be used as a 
blanket term for the escalatory logic of modernity which figures most prominently in 
economic growth, temporal speed-up and in increasing rates of change or social inno-
vation. In the following,1 I want to briefly define more precisely this process of social 
acceleration and the three dimensions that can be differentiated within it. Following 
this, I will try to elucidate how the acceleration of social change causes a two-step 
cultural transformation that has serious and systematic consequences for the shape of 
the human life-course and each time re-models the patterns of individual identity and 
biography. 
 
Three dimensions of social acceleration 
In order to understand the process of social acceleration we need to analytically dis-
tinguish three different dimensions, or types, of phenomena since the experience of 
acceleration can be related to the speed of goal-directed processes (a), to the rate of 
social change (b), and to the sense of a growing scarcity of time (c). 
 
a) Technological Acceleration 
The first most obvious, and most easily measurable, form of acceleration is the speed-
ing up of intentional, goal-directed processes of transport, communication, and pro-
duction that can be defined as technological acceleration. Although it is not always 
easy to measure the average speed of these processes, acceleration in this realm is 
undeniable. In fact, the industrial revolution and the recent ‘digital revolution’ can be 
                                                          
1 For this section, I draw heavily on my article The Universal Underneath the Multiple (Rosa 2006), 
sections II and IV.  
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interpreted as straightforward ‘dromocratic revolutions’ in this sense. Thus, the speed 
of communication is said to have increased by 107, the speed of personal transport by 
102, and the speed of data processing by 106 (Geißler 1999, 89). The effects of techno-
logical acceleration on social reality are certainly tremendous. For example, as Har-
vey (1990) and many others have pointed out repeatedly, our perception of space and 
time has been significantly transformed as space virtually appears to ‘contract’ and 
gradually loses its significance for orientation in the modern world. 
 
b) Acceleration of Social Change 
Whereas phenomena of the first category can be described as acceleration processes 
within society, the phenomena of this second category could be classified as accelera-
tions of society itself. When novelists, scientists, and journalists since the eighteenth 
century have observed the dynamization of Western culture, society, or history, they 
were not so much concerned with the spectacular technological advancements as with 
the (often simultaneously) accelerated processes of social change that rendered social 
constellations and structures as well as patterns of action and orientation unstable and 
ephemeral. Hence, within modernity, the rates of change themselves are changing. 
Thus, attitudes and values as well as fashions and lifestyles, social relations and obli-
gations as well as groups, classes, or milieus, social languages as well as forms of 
practice and habits tend to change at ever increasing rates.  
However, empirically measuring (rates of) social change remains an unresolved 
challenge. There is little agreement in sociology as to what the relevant indicators of 
change are and when alterations or variations actually constitute a genuine or ‘basic’ 
social change.2 Therefore, I want to suggest that sociology might avail itself of ap-
proaches developed in social philosophy as well as in systems-theory and define the 
acceleration of social change as an on-going contraction of the present (Lübbe 1998). 
Such a contraction is the consequence of the accelerating rates of cultural and social 
innovation. The measure is as simple as it is instructive: If we define the past as that 
which no longer holds/is no longer valid while the future denotes that which does not 
yet hold/is not yet valid, then the present is the time-span for which (to use an idea 
developed by Koselleck) the horizons of experience and expectation coincide. Only 
within these time-spans of relative stability can we draw on past experiences to orient 
our actions, and only within such periods is there some certainty of orientation, evalu-
ation, and expectation. In other words, social acceleration can be defined by an in-
crease in the decay-rates of the reliability of experiences and expectations and by the 
contraction of the time-spans definable as the ‘present.’ Now, conceptually, we can 
apply this measure of stability and change to social and cultural institutions and prac-
tices of all kinds: the present contracts in the political as well as the occupational, the 
technological as well as the aesthetic, the normative as well as the scientific or cogni-
tive dimensions, i.e. in cultural as well as in structural respects. 
But how could we verify this empirically? There seems to be fairly general agree-
ment in the social sciences that the basic structures of society are those that organize 
the processes of production and reproduction, which, in western societies are formed 
by the family and the occupational system. There is no doubt that the corresponding 
                                                          
2 Cf. Sztompka (1993). Peter Laslett (1988) distinguishes between 19 (!) different rates of internal social 
change (economic, political, cultural etc.). 
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institutions build the framework for the life-course regime (Kohli 1986). Therefore, 
we gain some measure of change if we pay attention to indicators suggesting that 
change in these two realms – family and work – has accelerated from an inter-
generational pace in early modern society to a generational pace in ‘classical moder-
nity’ to an intra-generational pace in late modernity. Thus, the ideal-type family 
structure in agrarian society tended to remain stable for centuries, with generational 
turnover leaving the basic structure intact. In ‘classical’ or ‘high’ modernity, by con-
trast, this structure was built to last for just a generation: it was organized around a 
couple and tended to disperse with its death. In late modernity, there is a growing 
tendency for family-cycles to last for less than an individual life-span: increasing rates 
of divorce and remarriage are the most obvious evidence for this. Similarly, in the 
world of work, in pre-modern societies the father’s occupation is inherited by the son 
– again, potentially over many generations. In ‘high’ modernity, occupational struc-
tures tended to change with generations: sons (and later daughters too) were free to 
choose their own profession, but they generally chose only once, i.e. for a lifetime. In 
late modernity, occupations are no longer meant to extend over the whole of a work-
life; jobs change at a higher rate than generations. As Daniel Cohen puts it: “Whoever 
begins a career at Microsoft has not the slightest idea where it will end. Whoever 
started it at Ford or Renault could be well-nigh certain that it will finish in the same 
place” (quoted in Bauman 2000, 116), while Richard Sennett (1998, Chapter 1) ob-
serves that the average American worker with an academic education changes his job-
position eleven times in a work-life of forty years. 
Hence, to formulate the argument more generally, the stability of social institu-
tions and practices can serve as a yardstick for the acceleration (or deceleration) of 
social change. In the work of authors like Peter Wagner (1994) and Beck, Giddens, 
and Lash (1994), further theoretical as well as empirical support can be found for the 
thesis that institutional stability is generally on the decline in late modern societies.  
 
c) Acceleration of the Pace of Life and the shift from work-life to work-age balance 
Interestingly, there is a third type of acceleration in modern societies that is neither 
logically nor causally entailed by the first two, but rather seems paradoxical with 
respect to technological acceleration. This third process is the ‘acceleration of the 
pace of life,’ which has been postulated again and again in the unfolding of modernity 
(e.g. Simmel 1971 or Levine 1998). It is the focus of much discussion about cultural 
acceleration and the alleged need for deceleration. The widespread sense that we are 
running out of time and that we have to speed up our actions in order to keep pace 
with the demands made upon us, along with increased feelings of stress, has been 
well documented for virtually all modern societies (cf. Robinson/Godbey 1999). 
While it is hard to see why, on the subjective side, we feel temporal stress in spite of 
the abundance of time-resources gained via technological acceleration, the speed-up 
of the pace of life can be objectively defined as an increase in the number of episodes 
of action or experience that we live through in a given unit of time, i.e. in an hour, a 
week, a year or a life-time. This increase is obtained by either speeding up individual 
actions themselves (as in fast-food, speed-dating or power-naps), or by reducing 
breaks and waiting-time between episodes of action, or finally via “multitasking”, i.e. 
completing several actions simultaneously (for empirical evidence, see Rosa 2005). 
210 Hartmut Rosa 
Most interestingly, when we ask how developments such as these impinge on the 
times of our life, we find that the perceived need to speed up our every-day-lives by 
getting more things done within a day, week, month or year (which itself is a conse-
quence of the constant growth of our ‘to-do-lists’ (Gergen 2000, 75; Robin-
son/Godbey 1999, 305)) not only affects the temporality of our everyday-patterns, but 
just as much the perspective on our life-time. This is because it seems increasingly 
impossible for the average worker to keep the work-life-balance during his or her 
working-life, which for many simply mirrors an endless rat-race, people seem to seek 
compensation in a shift in their life-time perspective. Given that the average life-span 
increases and many people reach retirement-age in a state of full mental and physical 
sanity, they start to postpone the ‘life-‘part in the work-life balance to that period of 
their life. This shift from the synchronic work-life-balance to a new, diachronic 
‘work-age’-balance might explain the embittered protest with which political initia-
tives to raise the retirement-age are met in many countries. 
 
A Two-Step Cultural Transformation 
If we accept the idea that with the advent of modernity the speed of social change 
starts to increase continuously – even though, of course, empirically, social accelera-
tion comes in waves and meets resistances and partial, temporary reversals – we are 
pressed towards the conclusion that this process of dynamization meets critical 
thresholds beyond which there appear qualitative shifts in the social space-time-
regime as well as in the experience of history and society; and hence in the predomi-
nant forms of self-perception, identity and the life-course. Most importantly, as au-
thors like Jan Assmann (1992) or Koselleck (1985) have shown, communicative so-
cial memory and the collectively shared awareness of past and present are limited to a 
period of about 80 to 100 years, since this denotes the time-span which the three (or 
maximally four) generations living together at any one point in history actually can 
oversee and communicate from their own experience. This implies that the divergence 
of the horizons of experience and expectation, so characteristic in Koselleck’s account 
of modernity, and hence the actual experience of a contraction of the present, can 
only become a cultural reality and gain social relevance when significant processes of 
endogenous social change occur within the life-time of these three (or four) genera-
tions living together, i.e., when the speed of social change crosses the threshold from 
an inter-generational to a generational pace. In other words: Only when grandparents, 
drawing on their own experience of the past, expect the future of their children and 
grand-children to be significantly different from their own, the perception of a pro-
gressing history, and of a society in change, can actually take hold. On the other hand, 
when processes of fundamental social change occur so rapidly that the basic condi-
tions appear to be unstable even within the life-time of a single generation (when 
social change, in other words, reaches the threshold of an intra-generational pace), 
the relationship between generations is obviously fundamentally altered once again 
(cf. Mannheim 1964) and the erosion of the stabilities and certainties of the life-world 
takes on a new character, once more transforming the experience of history and the 
patterns of identity. Hence, the prominence of postmodernist ideas in our time might 
well signify the crossing of such a threshold, beyond which the transmitted forms of 
narrative, linear and cumulative experiences of the world can no longer be sustained 
(Jameson 1998).  
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Now, as I have tried to point out in the last section, the idea of a progressive accel-
eration of social change in the process of modernization supposes precisely such an 
increase in the speed of social change, from an inter-generational pace in pre- and 
early modernity to, roughly, a generational pace in high- or ‘classical modernity’ and 
on to an intra-generational pace in our late-modern age of globalization. I have point-
ed out how such a claim could be empirically validated by referring to the decreasing 
stability and durability of ideal-type family- and occupational structures. Therefore, I 
restrict myself here to noting that on the level of normative ideals, this shift can also 
be observed: In pre-modern societies, individuals were expected to perpetuate the 
familial and occupational (as well as the religious and political) structures of their 
forbears, whereas a core-idea of ‘classical modernity’ is that every individual should 
found his or her own family, find his (and later on, her) defining job, a political and 
religious stance towards the world and so on. Thus, renewal, and not perpetuation, 
was a generational challenge, but – in its core as well as its peripheral dimensions 
such as hobbies and consumer-habits – this task of self-invention and choice was 
taken to be a once-and-for all challenge of adolescence: The possibility of conver-
sions notwithstanding, the normative ideal of classical or ‘high’ modernity involved 
the stable adherence to a once defined and then gradually developed individual life-
plan or life-project. Thus, whereas the life-course was individualized with respect to 
substantive decisions (job, family, religion, politics etc.), it was gradually re-
standardized with respect to its temporal form (Kohli 1986). In late-modernity, by 
contrast, such an ideal is considered to be utterly out of touch with the requirements 
of a highly dynamic society: To strictly adhere to life-choices once made, or to a life-
plan, appears to be not only utterly boring (who would want to stay with the same job 
(or partner) once and for all, or to stick to a life-long political conviction?!), but also 
dangerously inflexible and immobile in the age of dynamic turbo capitalism (Bauman 
2000; Sennett 1998). 
Now, it is a core-assumption of this essay that the progressive dynamization of so-
cial conditions leads to a twofold reversal in the cultural experience of time and histo-
ry, which is closely connected to the generational and the intra-generational thresh-
olds of social change identified above. Considering all we know about pre- and early 
modern societies, it is not implausible to assume that for them, historical time (despite 
the Christian expectation of an apocalyptic end of all times) appeared to be very much 
static in character: The horizons of experience (what is known from the past) and of 
expectation (what is to be expected from the future) extensively overlapped, the vast 
and often uncontrollable contingencies and the cyclic character of every-day life not-
withstanding. Hence, historical time appeared to be like a ‘container’ for manifold hi-
stories, which oftentimes repeated themselves, such that history could be the teacher 
of life (historia magistra vitae, as Koselleck (1985) points out incessantly): One could 
learn from the past how to act in the future.  
Quite to the contrary, in the rather short period between 1750 and 1830 termed 
‘saddle time’ by Koselleck and the editors of the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, a 
wholly new form of experiencing time and history emerges. For observers and com-
mentators of culture, politics and society alike, the past and the future became notably 
different, expectations started to diverge from experience, and hence, history started 
to move as if it were, Koselleck notes, a ‘singular subject’: History as such, becomes 
almost as an independent force with an identifiable direction, and the great “judge” to 
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human actions. I do not want to cite all the historical testimonies Koselleck and his 
colleagues adduce for proving this shift. Rather, I want to repeat my point that such a 
break in the cultural experience of time, history and society is an almost ‘natural’, 
expectable consequence of the acceleration of social change from the inter-
generational to the generational level: i.e. for the speed of endogenous social change 
crossing the first critical threshold of cultural perception. This threshold is crossed 
when basic conditions appear to change endogenously and regularly within less than 
80 to 100 years. Beyond that threshold, actors are convinced that the future will be 
structurally different from the past, and that change is driven endogenously, i.e. not by 
contingent exogenous events such as war or drought. Thus, Koselleck’s main point is 
the identification of a historical “temporalization” of history and politics.3 He leaves 
us in no doubt that this temporal shift was essentially connected to the perception of 
an acceleration of history and society themselves. Acceleration, he assures us, was the 
core-element of the new conception of society and history, and the idea of progress 
was a necessary and complementary element of this new cultural conception: it sig-
nalled the direction of social change. 
However, what Koselleck, being a historian, could not and did not foresee, is the 
emergence of a second significant break in the modern perception of (historical) time 
towards the end of the 20th century. Even though this second break – just as monu-
mental and essential as the first one – was heralded by various writers from the begin-
ning of the 20th century, it only became the dominant mode of cultural experience, I 
would argue, after 1989 following the end of the Cold War and the digital revolution 
culminating in the internet. From then on, history is no longer perceived to be mov-
ing: even though, of course, there will be more wars and more failed and re-built 
states, and new coalitions and movements and so on: i.e. even though there is frantic 
change there appears to be no more history in the singular, a history with a direction, 
a moving history. History stopped to be an evolving process. This is what all the her-
alds of the end of history, of post-histoire, tell us from Gehlen to Fukuyama, from 
Baudrillard to Virilio. But it is also what innumerable testimonies from high as well 
as dominant pop-culture tell us, from Coupland to Pink Floyd’s Roger Waters or to 
Imre Kertesz.4 In the late-modern perception of time, history is frantic as well as 
static in its pace: It is once again opening up to give space to myriads of histories 
which do not amount to a progressing history, thus resembling the pre-modern state 
except for the fact that change and contingency (producing the episodic histories) are 
now endogenous. 
This second fundamental transformation of the modern conception of time can be 
understood as a de-temporalization of history: Social, political and cultural events are 
                                                          
3 However, Koselleck remains ambiguous as to the causes of this shift: He finds empirical evidence for 
social acceleration only in the period after the industrial revolution, i.e. considerably later. So he attrib-
utes the cultural transformation to the political crisis and the emerging political expectations of the time, 
leading to a rapid series of disruptive events. However, this explanation remains wholly unsatisfactory 
since the political ruptures themselves are explained precisely by the shift in the social conception of 
time and history, thus leaving the argument in an explanatory circle. The reason for this conundrum, in 
my view, lies in the fact that Koselleck only examines technological acceleration as an empirical di-
mension of change, whereas he neglects evidence from the other two dimensions identified in section 
two above. For my own account of the causes of social acceleration, see Rosa 2005, Part III (243-332). 
4 Cf. Douglas Coupland’s celebrated novel Generation X (1991), Roger Waters’ Solo-Album Amused to 
Death (1992), or Imre Kertesz noble-prize winning book Fateless (1992). 
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no longer interpreted as being links in a progressive chain, but rather as contingent 
episodes in a highly contingent universe. A random succession of events, fragmented 
episodes and contradictory developments (such as secularization and de-
secularization, democratization and de-democratization, nation-building and nation 
states falling apart, the evolution of the welfare-state and the return of Manchester-
Capitalism, the return of torture and the global acceptance of the UN human rights 
Charter) has taken the place of what were thought to be historical sequences of social 
development (or progress). This is reflected in the fact that the political concepts 
Koselleck identifies as signifying the idea of (irreversible) dynamic movement in 
saddle time – all the -isms of the age – today just represent a ‘static’ array of reversi-
ble political alternatives: socialism, fascism, conservatism, liberalism etc. In this 
sense, the politico-historical time of the globalization-age is at once timeless and 
‘temporalized’ in the sense that the sequence of events is not pre-determined by any 
meta-historical logic or principle. No social theory or philosophy of history could 
foretell the course of history or identify an underlying logic of progress. Thus, history 
in the singular, as a subject and judge, is only conceivable within a certain “speed-
frame” of social change. In ‘saddle-time”, it appears, its lower threshold was crossed 
and history began to move, whereas in late-modernity, the upper barrier is transcend-
ed and history seems to fall back into inertia, albeit a highly dynamic one this time 
around. 
Now, even though it might appear so at first glance, this return of timeless time is 
not a simple return to the pre-modern conception of static-cyclical time: There is no 
‘natural cycle’ of progression as in the constitutional model of Polybios, and frantic 
change on the level of events and associations is caused by endogenous social forces, 
not the least of which are technological and scientific innovations. This, in my view, 
helps to explain why at the turn of the millennium, the experience of frantic change 
and radical social contingency on the one hand, and perceptions of radical (structural) 
inertia on the other, came to flourish simultaneously: Society is changing, but it is not 
going anywhere (cf. Niethammer 1989). Due to the modern logic of dynamic stabili-
zation, it needs growth, acceleration and constant innovation just to keep the status 
quo, to ensure its structural reproduction. 
This second change in the socio-cultural conception of time, I want to argue, is the 
consequence of the pace of social change crossing the critical threshold of intra-
generational speed: After the wave of social acceleration emanating from the political 
and digital revolutions around 1989, individuals in advanced societies can no longer 
expect their basic life-worlds to provide stable background conditions for their evolv-
ing life-course. Rather than developing or enacting a conception of personal identity 
over a life-time, the accelerated life-world structures now demand that subjects are 
ready to change their self-conceptions, political convictions etc. in accordance with a 
changing environment. Therefore, let us now turn to the biographical effects of this 
two-step-transformation. 
 
4. Biographical Effects: The Temporalization and De-Temporalization of Life 
With the crossing of the identified critical thresholds, not only the perception of time 
changes but with it the whole fabric and cultural substance of self and society are also 
transformed. This is due to the fact that society and self in their very essence are tem-
214 Hartmut Rosa 
poral and processual rather than static and solid (Lauer 1981). This provides the basis 
for my claim that substantive transformations of identity are not only compatible with, 
but an inevitable effect of, the continuous abstract process of social acceleration. 
The classical or ‘high-modern’ conception of individual identity dominant in 
Western societies for most of the twentieth century is based on the idea that each 
individual could and should find his or her place and stance in the world: find a pro-
fession, found a family, work out a political and a religious conviction that are ‘true 
to yourself’ and ‘authentic’, and then grow and develop according to your individual 
life-plan based on these elements. This, in a nutshell, is the modern conception not 
only of identity, but of individual autonomy, of authenticity, of the life-course and the 
good life as well. Basically, the challenge of identity each individual faces is to find 
his or her place, his or her position, in and towards the world. Of course, such a con-
ception is unimaginable within a social world that is intended to remain stable from 
one generation to the next, i.e. for which the basic productive and re-productive struc-
tures as well as the political and religious order are not meant to change dynamically 
from one generation to the next, but to be invariantly transmitted over many genera-
tions. With a generational pace of social change, individual life itself is experienced 
as ‘progressing’ along developmental lines (of the life-course, the family-cycle and 
the carrier-path, cf. Kohli 1986, Rosa 2005, 352-362). The experiences and events of 
the life-course are interpreted and narrated as the cumulative elements and links of an 
evolving, directed life-history, as a story of growth, development and fulfilment (Sen-
nett 1998). 
However, this conception becomes untenable and unappealing once the speed of 
social change crosses the intra-generational barrier. As I have already pointed out, just 
as politics turns situationalistly in the late-modern age, identities, too, lose the charac-
ter of ‘temporalized projects’: What we are is something that has to be decided from 
context to context and from one chronological stage to the next, not over the course of 
a complete individual life-time. Identity is no longer about (professional, familial, 
political or religious) positions sought and reached, but about (professional, familial, 
political and religious) performances: Synchronically as well as diachronically, who 
and what we ‘are’ has to be (re-)negotiated performatively. The idea of living out a – 
professional, familial or political – life-plan seems strangely anachronistic in a world 
of incessant economic, occupational, cultural and political change. This transfor-
mation of late-modern identities can easily be traced even within ordinary language. 
Today we either temporalize or renounce identity-markers all together: We no longer 
are bakers, New Yorkers, husbands, Republicans or Catholics tout court – rather, we 
work as bakers right now, we are New Yorkers for five years, we live with such and 
such (for now), voted Republican last time and attend Catholic services. All these 
building-blocks of identity might change at any time, due to our own decisions or to 
changing circumstances, even though they might just as well remain unchanged for 
quite a long time. In any case, they have become unstable and contingent even if they 
don’t change. What, where and with whom we will be next (and how long our current 
self-definitions will remain valid) will be decided as time evolves, in a ‘performative’ 
mode, not according to a life-plan. Thus, as identities (just as history and politics) are 
de-temporalized, time itself is temporalized in the sense that the order, duration and 
sequence of events are now open to the temporal process itself. Importantly, this 
change has not just been forced upon us – it has just as much been embraced by late-
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modern culture. Hence, a new conception of flexible, experimental, reversible, rela-
tional, situationalist or even multiple identities – as postmodernist authors have been 
advocating for a long time – appears to be a ‘natural’ complement to an intra-
generational pace of social change5 (cf. table 1). 
 
Table 1: The Speed of Social Change and the Perception of Time 
 
 Pre- and Early 
Modernity “High” Modernity Late Modernity 
Speed of 
endogenous 
social change 
Change-rates below 
the speed of genera-
tional exchange 
(inter-generational 
pace) 
Change-rates approach-
ing the speed of genera-
tional exchange 
(generational pace) 
Change-rates above the 
speed of generational 
exchange  
(intra-generational 
pace) 
Indicators: 
family- and 
occupational 
structures 
Inter-generational 
stability  
(family as economic 
unit) 
Changes according to 
generational pace: 
Individualization of 
work and family  
(generations as bearers 
of innovation) 
Successions of jobs and 
intimate partnerships 
replace life-time com-
mitments  
(‘serial monogamies’ of 
work and family) 
Perception of 
everyday time 
Congruence of the 
horizons of experi-
ence and expectation 
(cyclical time) 
Separation of the hori-
zons of past, present 
and future 
(linear time) 
the sequence, rhythm 
and duration of events is 
contingent on the course 
of time  
(‘timeless’, yet ‘tempor-
alized time’) 
Conception of 
historical 
time 
Historical time as a 
“container” for “hi-
stories” 
(Static conception) 
History as an intelligi-
ble and directed process 
prone to political shap-
ing; temporal index of 
politics: progressive vs. 
conservative (Tempor-
alization of History) 
“End of History” in the 
high-modern sense: 
non-directed, erratic, yet 
frantic change; “situa-
tionalist politics” no 
longer historical “pace-
maker” (De-
temporalized history) 
Conception  
of life-time 
centred around day-
to-day challenges on 
the one hand and 
based on substantive, 
trans-individual 
identities on the 
other  
(‘situative-static’ 
perception of life) 
Perspective of a pro-
gressively evolving life-
course on the basis of 
stable, yet self-
determined individual 
identities 
(Temporalization of 
life) 
Perspective of a contin-
gent and reversible life-
course, episodic addi-
tion replaces narrative 
of cumulative growth; 
performative identities 
(De-Temporalization of 
life) 
 
                                                          
5 In a similar vein, Zygmunt Bauman (1993, 240 f.) compares the ‘modern pilgrim’, who feels that he or 
she is on his/her way to a destined end, to the post-modern vagabond, who is ‘a nomad without an itin-
erary’ or a destination, and the tourist who “knows that he will not stay for long where he has arrived. 
And as in the vagabond’s case, he has only his own biographical time to string together the places he 
visits; otherwise, nothing orders them in this rather than another temporal fashion.” 
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Obviously, this account of the history of modern identity is overtly simplified and 
schematic. Nevertheless, I believe, it provides empirical research with a fruitful yard-
stick for further explorations in the sense of Max Weber’s ideal-types. Before I turn to 
the possible shapes of late-modern ‘performative’ identities, I therefore want to sum-
marize the three historical forms of individual identity that result from my temporal 
analysis of modernity along the three dimensions of ‘our time’ – everyday-time, life-
time and historical time – defined in part two of this paper. 
 
Pre- and Early Modernity: Stable identity ‘a priori’ 
Before the pace of change reached a generational-tempo in the sense defined above, 
i.e. before ‘classical’ modernity institutionalized its mode of dynamic stabilization, 
life for the individual was often both: erratic or random as well as static and inert. 
This pertains to the level of everyday-time as well as to the structure of the life-
course. In many respects, time was experienced as cyclical and activities were rou-
tinized. There was a significant overlap between experience and expectation. While it 
was impossible to foresee exogenous contingencies (such as disease or drought or 
wars or accidents etc.), the estate-based world itself, in its structural features, tended 
to remain the ‘ever-same’. It was unforeseeable on the level of events, but inert on the 
level of structures. This is why Koselleck maintains that the historical world is per-
ceived to be ‘timeless’ in pre-modern societies: Filled with unpredictable stories 
which have no historical order and which can inform future generations by way of 
historical examples. Identity and the life-course were pre-defined by birth: Who one 
is, what one believes in or what one does, in a traditional society, is answered not 
through looking inward, but through looking ‘outward’: for example, into the strati-
fied world and social order of nobles and craftsmen, beggars and monks etc., and into 
the ‘holy scripture’. Thus, the position of an individual in and towards the world is 
also prefixed. This I call a ‘stable identity a priori’. 
 
High-Modernity: Stable and positional identity ‘a posteriori’ 
As I have tried to point out by referring to Koselleck, with the advent of high-
modernity the perception of time changes significantly in that the horizons of experi-
ence and expectation diverge: The future is supposed to be different from the past, 
and therefore, historical time is no longer predominantly cyclical but linear and pro-
gressive in nature. In the course of this generations become the bearers of innovation: 
Identity is constitutively gained not by taking the positions of the fathers (and moth-
ers), but by finding and defining them anew along relatively fixed lines. As Kohli 
(1986) and others have pointed out, in this process the life-course gets ‘standardized’ 
and institutionalized. Finding one’s professional, familial, political and religious etc. 
positions is the challenge of ‘adolescence’. In later life (although conversions remain 
a possibility) these positions are deepened and pursued along pre-defined ‘career-
paths’. As Kohli (2009, 81) puts it, “the claim to individual growth is institutionalized 
in the form of basic cultural codes”. High-modern identities therefore are easily cap-
tured in the narrative form of stories of growth and/or progress.6 Thus, while the 
question of who one is gets actually dynamized (to a generational pace of change) and 
                                                          
6 This is exemplified beautifully in Richard Sennett‘s account of Enrico (the father) in Sennett (1998). 
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individualized, everyday-time as well as life-time become surprisingly predictable 
and even standardized: On the level of everyday-time, fixed schedules (working-
times, meal-times, shopping times, family-times, bed-times etc.) gain hold, while the 
life-course follows pre-scheduled and institutionalized patterns (kindergarten, school-
ing, military service, work-life, retirement etc.). Life in this sense is ‘temporalized’: 
History seems to be moving and has a (predictable) direction, and so do individual 
lives. 
 
Late-Modernity: Performative identity  
In many ways, the patterns of late-modernity seem to reverse the features of high-
modernity: The predominant experience of time is no longer linear and progressive, 
but fragmentary and episodic. Cyclical, linear and static elements are on a par in this 
world of intra-generational change. As I have pointed out, on the level of historical 
time, progress is no longer an experiential reality: For the first time in modernity, 
parents in Western societies no longer expect a brighter or better future for their chil-
dren, but rather an intensified struggle to keep to standards and avoid disasters. Con-
sequently, conceptions of an ‘End of History’ abound. Interestingly, we find the same 
‘de-scheduling’ on the level of everyday-time and life-time, as well: In a 24/7-society, 
working time, family time, recreational-time, shopping-time etc. blend into each oth-
er. Each sphere of life no longer has a pre-fixed temporal window, but sends its de-
mands and offers its opportunities simultaneously. Thus, what is done when is no 
longer a matter of time-plans and schedules, but is answered ‘performatively’, as we 
move along. And the same can be said about the life-time-perspective: Times of work, 
of (re-)education, of (enforced or voluntary) idleness follow each other in no particu-
lar or predictable order, and whether or not we marry, separate, have kids etc. is no 
longer pre-fixed either. We decide it (or suffer it) ‘as we move along’. This performa-
tive attitude also pertains in the world of religious and political orientation: As we 
know from electoral research, people tend to decide about their votes according to the 
performance of parties and politicians. They no longer define themselves as conserva-
tive, liberal or socialist and, similarly, they re-negotiate their religious leanings and 
preferences (Beck/Beck-Gernsheim 1994). On both levels – the everyday as well as 
the life-course – individual time-experience gradually shifts from a pre-structured to a 
more episodic character. This is particularly relevant with respect to the life-time 
perspective: Instead of being a married, catholic baker living in Detroit, one might 
have been a married, catholic baker living in Detroit, one is now a single, protestant 
broker on Wall Street and one might be a gay atheist artist in Washington. Of course, 
these identity-markers do not all shift simultaneously, but independently of each oth-
er: One might have turned an artist before one became an atheist etc. And of course, 
most people remain fairly stable in most dimensions of identity; nevertheless, they 
can no longer take any one position for granted.7  
                                                          
7 This is exemplified, by contrast, in the story of Rico (the son) in Sennett 1998. If the reader finds my 
examples too extreme, he or she might be referred to the spectacular case of a violent, right-wing Ger-
man man who became a left-wing woman and nurse running for a seat of the Baden-Württemberg state-
parliament in 2011 (Badische Zeitung, March 13th 2011: www.badische-zeitung.de/kreis-
emmendingen/monika-strub-ich-moechte-glaubwuerdig-sein--42600857.html). 
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In fact, one could call this a de-positionalization of identity, but this term is not 
wholly accurate since, of course, positions still are important in a competitive world. 
Nevertheless, it is the capacity and the willingness to (performatively) re-position 
oneself that is decisive for the late modern types of identity. Both, capacity and will-
ingness for a flexible re-definition of identity, however, cannot be taken for granted. It 
is precisely here that we can distinguish four different types or patterns of late-modern 
identity I will try to briefly sketch out now by way of conclusion. 
 
5. Conclusion: Four late-modern patterns of identity 
What I have tried to point out in this paper is the structurally caused pressure towards 
a form of identity that thrives on intra-generational stability. Because of the fast pace 
of social change (with respect to practices, knowledge, patterns of association, posi-
tions, institutions etc.), the defining predicates of identity such as family position, job, 
hometown, political or religious convictions, hobbies (or even peripheral markers 
such as bank-account, daily newspaper, insurance company etc.) can no longer be 
supposed to be stable for a life-time. Even if, with hindsight, some of them actually 
did remain stable for the whole of (an adult) life, it is risky to consider them essential 
to one’s identity. Those who actually try to pursue a life-plan are always in danger of 
becoming anachronistic and frustrated by the course of events. Thus, individuals, in 
leading their lives and maintaining an identity, have to react or adapt to this structural 
requirement of ‘their (historical) time’ in one form or the other. At present, we might 
– in a very tentative and preliminary mode – heuristically reconstruct four emerging 
types of reaction in late-modern (Western) societies which create four possible types 
of identity.  
 
The Surfer: Mastering the waves 
The first late-modern type can be termed the ‘Surfer’: What he actually does is to 
cling to the modern, enlightenment promise of autonomy, but to redefine it in a way 
that coheres to his ‘historical time’. Contrary to the ‘high-modern’ character, the surf-
er does not try to define a life-plan, a life-project or a life goal. He does not seek to 
give his life an overall direction or shape. Rather, he acquires the capacity to ‘master 
the waves’: i.e. to recognize and ‘jump’ when a great wave comes along and when the 
wind and tide are favourable. Kenneth Gergen makes this point very aptly when con-
trasting his old, ‘high-modern’ conception of self or identity with his new surfer-self: 
 
I am also struggling against my modernist training for constant improvement, 
advancement, development, and accumulation. Slowly I am learning the pleas-
ures of relinquishing the desire to gain control of all that surrounds me. It is 
the difference between swimming with deliberation to a point in the ocean – 
mastering the waves to reach a goal – and floating harmoniously with the un-
predictable movements of the waves. (Gergen 2000, XVIII) 
 
The latter remark, however, in my view blurs the distinction between the Surfer and 
the Drifter: The surfer is not the passive object, let alone victim, of the ‘unpredicta-
ble’ play of waves and winds: He decides for himself when he is ready to jump (to 
another job, company, city, partner, party or church), and whether or not the other 
Terrorists and High-Speed Surfers 219 
wave is worth the try. Thus, he has a clear set of priorities, even though these priori-
ties might change ‘performatively’, and he has sufficient economic, social and cultur-
al resources to ‘jump’ when he sees fit. This logic dominates his everyday-time just as 
much as his life-course perspective. As Hörning, Ahrens and Gerhard (who refer to 
this type as ‘the gambler’ (Spieler), 1999) have pointed out, the Surfer is not running 
on pre-fixed schedules, he does not adhere to any form of time-management: He de-
cides spontaneously when to accelerate, slow-down, finish or repeat activities; and the 
same goes for questions of timing or sequencing. (With respect to everyday-time this 
means, for example, that one day he works first and long, then does the shopping and 
afterwards the running, the next day he spontaneously starts with shopping, then 
works a bit, stops for some exercise and then goes on working, whereas the third day 
he might start jogging without having any plans for what to do afterwards etc.). In this 
way, he still can present himself as the master of his life, even though not as the au-
thor of a life-story. He clearly is an ‘other-directed’ character in that he leaves the 
goals he sets for himself to the uncontrollable play of opportunities and hindrances, he 
does not try to pursue an ‘authentic’, inner-directed conception of life. Nevertheless, 
he stays on top, and he is mastering the waves. In this sense, the Surfer represents a 
successful form of performative identity. This, of course requires the capacity, flexi-
bility, creativity and willingness for constant ‘re-definition’ and ‘re-invention’. By 
definition, only a small, elite minority can develop a surfer-identity, for it takes con-
siderable resources to jump the waves this way – and the power to define situations 
and to decide on changes rather than being simply exposed to changing circumstanc-
es. Besides, the unpredictability and ultimate non-reliability of the Surfer would lead 
to disastrous consequences if this identity-style was actually adopted by everyone. 
The jet-set flexible elite still needs solid, stable and reliable ground-crews to pursue 
their wave-riding. Thus, those who cannot be Surfers probably end up as Drifters. 
 
The Drifter: Pulled under and pushed around 
Whereas the Surfer decides when it is time to ‘jump the waves’, most people very 
often cling to, or are content with, what they have but are exposed to unexpected 
situational changes. Thus, they might lose their job, or their company closes down, 
they are left by their boy- or girlfriend, forced to move etc. An additional push- or 
pull-factor might be their own moods and desires. They might in fact spontaneously 
quit their jobs, hometowns or families, but – contrary to the Surfer – without a good, 
let alone a better, alternative at hand. In this way, they do not jump the waves, but are 
in danger of being pushed around or pulled under by the heavy waters of late-
modernity. Just as the Surfer, the Drifter renounces the idea of having a life-long set 
of values and allegiances, or a life-plan or project he or she pursues. But contrary to 
the Surfer, Drifters are the victims rather than the masters of the waves of life. They 
are exposed to risks and changes they can neither calculate nor determine. This is the 
sense in which Richard Sennett defines the ‘Drift’ in his Corrosion of Character 
(1998). And in fact, his main characters are Drifters rather than Surfers: They errati-
cally drift from job to job, or from place to place and from one temporal moment to 
the next without being able to gain any form of autonomy with respect to their lives. 
This is not to deny that there can be very strong and passionate temporary (situation-
alist) identifications (with one’s football club, one’s nation, church or rock-group), 
but all the plans Drifters make or the goals they set for themselves, the associations 
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they build and the experiences they acquire, are progressively devaluated and nulli-
fied by the incessant dynamics of modern society. Hence, they yearn for the old form 
of the high-modern, stable identity.  
Drift can be a strategy for everyday-time, too, but, as Robert Lauer (in accordance 
with Sennett) argues, the loss of structure and purpose in everyday-life quickly results 
in social decline or even chaos (Lauer 1981, 37 and 114). Thus, most Drifters follow 
routines and schedules in everyday-life, but they fail to integrate their everyday-time-
perspective with an overall conception of life-time. 
 
The Depressive: Exhausted, burnt-out selves and ‘temporal suffocation’ 
Because of this failure, both Drifters and Surfers are threatened by the permanent 
possibility of a psychological exhaustion that can lead to burn-out or depression. Such 
a state of affairs can be the result of the ‘weary’ surfer-self who is wasted by the per-
manent need to re-invent, re-present and re-constitute identity and the perceived lack 
of any overall-meaning or direction of life (Ehrenberg 2010). But of course, it also 
threatens the Drifter who feels that he or she has no control over his or her life: Low 
self-efficacy and lack of control over the circumstances of one’s life are among the 
main sources for psycho-somatic problems and feelings of alienation (Schwarzer 
1992). In fact, there seem to be good reasons to assume that the resulting forms of 
depression are the pathological consequence of a permanent failure to integrate life-
time and everyday-time perspectives in the context of a historically situated life. As a 
result, the vital connection between past, present and future that defines personal 
identity breaks down. As Lothar Baier observes: “For depressives, time is tied up in 
knots, it feels like temporal suffocation. There is no meaningful connection between 
past, present and future, no temporal ‘flow’. This in turn re-enforces the feeling that 
one is cut-off from historical time” (Baier 2000, 157 f., my translation, H.R.). Quite 
generally, depressives appear to feel that they live in ‘frozen time’ (Levine 1998, 36 
f.). This, of course, quickly extends to everyday-time, too: In depression, all relevanc-
es are lost behind a great veil of indifference and inertia, hence it is extremely diffi-
cult to structure even everyday routines. Thus, this type of ‘performative identity’ 
clearly is pathological in that it is a stress-reaction to the psycho-social requirements 
of late-modernity rather than a viable solution. 
 
The Fundamentalist: In search of a transcendent anchor  
For those who do not want to be Drifters and who are not capable (or willing) to be-
come Surfers, there might be an alternative to Depression. Subjects who still cling to 
the idea of a stable, life-long and reliable identity and a ‘rooted’ as well as directed, 
progressing life (in the sense of the high-modern conception of identity) can no longer 
safely base their substantive identities on parameters such as jobs, families, 
hometowns etc. If in late-modernity, the ‘turbillon sociale’ (Rousseau) is too strong 
and dynamic to allow for generational steadiness, stability can only be taken from 
some rock-bottom, transcendently anchored truth or certainty. Thus, if there really is a 
(empirically measurable) ‘return of religion’ in late-modernity, this, in my view, is the 
most plausible reason for it. If not just my family, my party and my boss, but even the 
welfare-state-provisions can desert me any time, I can only find my permanent an-
choring in a transcendent realm such as God or the Bible. Whatever may happen to 
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me, thou shalt be with me is the formula that works as an identity-insurance against 
even the worst forms of earthly contingency. I may not know where I will live tomor-
row, what I will do for a living and whom I shall be living with, my nation-state might 
have dissolved and my temple might be burnt down, but I will still be a Jehovah’s 
Witness, or a Jihadist, a Hindu or a Satanist for that matter.  
In a way, to some extent at least, such a ‘fundamentalist’ definition of identity 
might be compatible with the actual life-performance of a Surfer. Since stability is not 
gained in the parameters that can be affected by endogenous social change such as 
hometowns, family-structures, hobbies, political parties etc., one might be a ‘wave-
rider’ in all of these dimensions and still feel rooted in a stable identity. However, 
there clearly arise problems for the temporal integration of the three-levels of bio-
graphical time. If our confessional identity is completely detached from our everyday-
practices and the biographical course of our life, and eventually even from the histori-
cal time we live in (since in late-modernity, the idea of an eternal truth and validity is 
inevitably somewhat anachronistic and counter-intuitive), its capacity to integrate the 
three time-perspectives remains limited.  
Thus, adherence to the idea of a stable identity in late-modernity cannot but lead to 
(fundamental) opposition to the modern social order. Such fundamentalist opposition 
is displayed, most strikingly, in the conception of the Taliban, for example, whose 
prospect of social order clearly rejects any form of dynamic stabilization. 
Such opposition need not be defined in religious terms, however: There are other 
candidates for quasi-transcendent anchorings of identity, such as nationalism, racism 
or political radicalism. Perhaps this helps to explain the strange attraction or fascina-
tion that the left-wing terrorist organizations of the 1970s – such as the German Rote 
Armee Fraktion or the Brigade Rosse in Italy – have for youths (and adults) in the 21st 
century. In straight opposition to the demands for incessant reversibility, flexibility 
and adaptability and to the terminal insecurity and uncertainty about values, positions 
and convictions that haunt late-modernity, these terrorists placed all their cards, their 
whole identities, and their lives on one bet: They did not leave any opportunities or 
possibilities for future reversals. Thus, they acted in open rejection of the late modern 
categorical imperative to always try to increase one’s range of options and opportuni-
ties. Instead, terrorists take the reverse route of radically and performatively narrow-
ing down options and opportunities. In this, the Terrorist is the ultimate antipode of 
the Surfer. Neither type of identity, however, appears to be very attractive or viable. 
Therefore, the search for positive types of performative identity is still open. 
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